



Views of the NTW on the needs to enhance public communication and involvement for nuclear emergency planning

Public Communication on nuclear emergencies
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Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) Working Group (EP&R WG)

- EP&R working group was established **with the creation of NTW in November 2013**
- **The aim of EP&R WG is:**
 - to carry out an evaluation of the existing European and national EP&R provisions from the civil society point of view, identifying key challenges,
 - to inform public on the findings and
 - to provide guidance for further activities of the interested public.
- **10 European countries:** Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Ukraine, Sweden and Slovenia involving 21 participants from 15 organisations.
- **The results:**
 - Report of NTW on Emergency Preparedness & Response work (200 pages),
 - Position paper of NTW on Emergency Preparedness & Response situation in Europe (15 pages).

Presentation of the EP&R report

After one-year investigation of off-site EP&R, **the reports has been presented on April 15 2015 at the European Parliament** in the presence of MEPs, representatives of the European Commission and Public institutions.



Information collection and analyses of EP&R

- **International seminars**

with expert institutions and international associations,

- **Desk work**

to review the national provisions and international requirements,

- **Interviews and questionnaires**

with representatives of responsible institutions and local populations,

- **The investigations performed by the EU institutions**

(i.e. the “Review of current off-site nuclear emergency preparedness and response arrangements in EU member states and neighbouring countries“ study).,

- **The organisation of transboundary roundtables**

involving the participation of responsible institutions and civil society.



Main findings in EP&R WG -1

- Evaluation of national EP&R provisions
 - EP provisions remains outdated, inadequate, delusional and not real in many cases
 - Evacuation (large scale) not possible in many cases
 - Lack of efficient radiation monitoring devices
 - Lack of local authorities (and local population) awareness and training
 - Inadequate medical support
- Assessment of Plans, including involvement of Citizens
 - Lessons of Emergency exercises & drills are limitedly taken into account
 - Sub-optimal management of response: lack of radiological expertise among first responders, late transfer of data or lack of it, operational rooms for command,...
 - Poor maintenance of Emergency plans
 - No independent review or evaluation of plans
 - CS not involved in planning
- Emergency information
 - Total lack of communication between different concerned administration
 - On – site emergency is remit of operator and not shared with people
 - No use of new media for information dissemination
 - Communication and notification lines for responsible are not entirely working.

Main findings in EP&R WG - 2

- Trans-boundary dimension of nuclear accidents
 - EP&R is dealt at national level, with little trans-boundary cooperation
 - Heterogeneity of existing EP&R provisions is a real threat
 - Difficulty to bring together all the players across borders in order to discuss EP&R
- Post-accident consequences
 - Nuclear accidents have (very) Long Term complex consequences that need to be addressed
 - Post-accident situations necessitates complex recovery processes involving the population
 - Only addressed by very few countries today (like France), with minor scenario – difficulties of local implementation, especially in case of trans boundary situation
 - Need for clarification of food standards and their harmonisation
- On-site emergency management
 - Questions on the availability of human resources
 - Protection of workers which was evident during Fukushima accident
 - Availability of technical tools

Main findings in EP&R WG - 3

■ Nuclear liability

- Abyssal gaps between accident costs and existing insurance provisions
- Need for investigations on actual costs of accidents based on recent Fukushima experience (compensation)
- Public liability replaces private liability?

Main recommendations from EP&R report

- **Need for detailed CSO evaluation** of EP&R provisions in each country
- **Need for CSO and public engagement** in planning and management at local, national and trans-boundary levels
- **Harmonise emergency provisions** (emergency zoning on evacuation, sheltering, iodine distribution)
- Need for developing a **legal framework involving CSOs at each level** of preparation and decision in the spirit of the Aarhus Convention
- **Develop a EU wide policy on EP&R** – EC should take the lead (like for updating of nuclear safety after Stress Tests)
- **Need for appropriate resources** for CSO and local communities to be involved
- **Need for quality control procedures** (QA/QC) including feed-back of new events, exercises & drills (learning process)
- **Reconsider evacuation process** in the case of large urban area
- **Integrate rescue and radiation experts** in civil protection staff
- **Train medical staff**
- **Finance research activities** in this area
- **Develop Medium - Long Term post-accident policies**
- **Create a CS-EP cooperation** to investigate liabilities for NPPs accident

NTW experience on possible ways for EP&R stakeholder involvement

- Identifying the stakeholders:
 - Official representatives defined in the national system,
 - But also citizens, civil society organisations and NGOs, together with the private sector (professionals, industry, retail, etc)
- Multi-stakeholder discussion organised by civil society organisation including various stakeholders:
 - National round tables with different players (civil protection authorities, nuclear regulatory bodies, municipalities, citizens) – identifying challenges and discussion possible solutions,
 - Transboundary round tables during 2013-2015 in several countries,
 - EU round tables in the context of Aarhus convention and nuclear where broader issues can be discussed.
- Working on the process to bring all stakeholders and to serve a catalyst for all involved players.
- Performing surveys and analyses of the real situation, developing the communication and ensuring stakeholder involvement in plans.

Advantages of a multi-stakeholder involvement

- An effective implementation of the BSS requires the involvement of all stakeholders, and thus the civil society.
 - The involvement of civil society brings many advantages:
 - **Expert advice and analysis.** CSOs can give access to competing ideas from outside the normal official channels
 - **Information collection and dissemination.** CSOs can give ideas about the real situation around NPPs and local communication.
 - **Mobilization of public opinion and building trust.** CSOs can influence the public through campaigns and broad outreach and can make information about EP&R arrangements widely accessible.
 - **Representation of the voiceless.** CSOs can help vocalize the interests of persons not well-represented and the most affected.
 - **Legitimization of decision-making mechanisms.** CSOs could broaden the base of information for decision-making, improving the quality, authoritativeness, and legitimacy of EP&R arrangements.
- => By playing a mediating role between different players, the civil society is a good catalyst for change and improvement.

Expectations of civil society for BSS directive on EP&R arrangements

- BSS directive should be implemented effectively and not just “formally”,
- CSOs should be actively involved – by giving them the role in the EP&R in planning, testing and improving the provisions,
- CSOs should be involved already now with the process on how to effectively realise and transpose the requirements of the BSS directive in national systems,
- Multi-stakeholders discussion need to be held with the support of the EC in parallel to other activities,
- Sufficient level of devolution for all emergency management system phases (planning, testing, revision, improvement) shall be promoted - including the creation of capacities for protection and monitoring,
- Civil society must be supported by adequate resources to fulfil its missions.

Possible follow-up: 2016-2017

- **Systematic investigation of EP&R provisions** at different national and transboundary levels based on modified approach used for the EP&R report.
- **Influence of improvements made in new legal EU framework** (BSS, Safety directive, food standards) requirements would be analysed
- **Round tables:**
 - Aarhus Convention & Nuclear round tables linking EU associations (HERCA, WENRA, ENSREG), EUP, EC and NTW: 22-23 March 2016, Brussels
 - Cross border RT on trans-boundary cooperation/harmonisation,
 - Nationally with all relevant stakeholders - Interactions between regulators, civil protection authorities, local municipalities, operators, NGOs, civil society and other interested organisations and citizens.
- **Possible cooperation of CSO in EU research projects** (H2020/Euratom)

[Thank you for your attention !]



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